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Introduction
Do we really need another study on the British landings upon the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915? After all, the landings and subsequent campaign were studied in detail during the 1920s and 1930s in British and American staff colleges, each searching for clues and lessons learned. The very word "Gallipoli" conjures up visions of amphibious assault and failure of what might have been. Yet, studied as it was, the Gallipoli campaign, its lessons and effects, meant many different things to many different military officers. Why then, after studying the Gallipoli Campaign, did the British and the Americans come to contradictory operational conclusions regarding the future applicability and doctrine of amphibious operations?
In this paper I plan to demonstrate that the divergent or contradictory views from the lessons of the Gallipoli campaign are the result of three differing operational approaches to strategic considerations facing Britain and the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. The first was differing theater strategic objectives requiring different operational campaigns necessary to achieve each. The second was differing operational experiences, causing one side to focus on the past while the other to the future. The third was the differing means available to operational commanders to execute their campaign. Finally, the Gallipoli campaign and its lessons demonstrate the seductiveness of what appears to be a good analogy. All of this is central to how an operational commander derives and interprets lessons learned from past operations or historical case studies, whether for future operations, or recommendations for joint force or service competencies.
Background
The Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 originated in a brilliant attempt to break the stalemate on the Western Front by knocking Turkey out of the war and to shore up a Russian ally by opening up a route of supply through the Dardanelles and Black Sea. It was to be the first amphibious assault in modern history and a campaign that was to have lasting effects on the future of amphibious operations. 1 Gallipoli provided future amphibious warfare theorists outstanding lessons in operational art on how not to conduct amphibious operations. From the start of the campaign, the lack of amphibious doctrine for modern warfare and a series of errors seriously hindered the expedition's possibility for success. A lack of forethought and planning was evident throughout the campaign. Despite its maritime heritage, Britain had made few preparations for amphibious operations in a modern war, and it showed at Gallipoli.
The Gallipoli campaign was fraught with last minute changes and required desperate ingenuity to get the whole thing underway. To make matters worse, insufficient and untrained troops were assigned to the landings, and subsequent reinforcements were piecemealed into the campaign. The lack of an operational reserve in the initial landings prevented the Army commander from reinforcing success at one or any of the beachheads.
Troops and equipment were not combat-loaded when the expedition initially embarked for the invasion, which later required off load and re-embarkation in Egypt. With this delay, combined with a total lack of operations security, the element of operational surprise was lost between the Royal Navy's first attempt to force the Dardanelles in March and the Army's initial landings in April. When the expedition sailed from Egypt to Gallipoli, few rehearsals were conducted prior to any amphibious operations in theater. 2 As plans for the campaign progressed, matters did not improve. Cooperation between operational commanders left much to be desired; the Army and Navy commanders were not collocated, and the effort lacked unity of command. Unity of effort was further hampered by the fact that there was no joint objective for the operation. General Ian Hamilton, the Army commander, believed the attack would coincide with continued navy pressure in the Dardanelles; Admiral John de Robeck, the naval commander, decided not to attack until the Army was firmly established ashore. 3 Despite the debacle and the resulting historical perception, the British did demonstrate some positive aspects of operational art in amphibious operations. In April 1915, they and their allies did not have numerical superiority over the Turkish defenders at Gallipoli. In fact, five British and ANZAC divisions faced six Turkish divisions on the peninsula. The numerically weaker British forces made brilliant use of an amphibious raid and two amphibious demonstrations to gain numerical advantage for their main and supporting attacks. These three maneuvers, which used only fifteen percent of the British forces, were able to delay the arrival of one-third of the Turkish defenders into the area of the main attack for twenty four hours. As a result, when surprise was achieved the landings incurred few casualties among the assault troops. 4 The subsequent landings at Suvla in August 1915 demonstrated some evidence of lessons learned from the April 1915 landings. A nighttime amphibious assault was executed in an attempt to break the stalemate of trench warfare on the lower tip of the Gallipoli peninsula; the assault landing at Suvla achieved surprise, and the British suffered relatively few casualties. Finally, upon the decision to end the campaign, the British successfully conducted an amphibious withdrawal, with total surprise and without the loss of a single life, all the while closely engaged with the enemy. For later amphibious theorists, the British at Gallipoli demonstrated brilliantly the four types of modern amphibious operations: the raid, the demonstration, the assault, and the withdrawal. 
The British Approach
In the immediate aftermath of Gallipoli and in the inter war years, much ink was spilled in Britain on the failures of the campaign. It proved an intensely emotional topic that stifled amphibious doctrine development. The lessons of Gallipoli derived by the British were interpreted not only through operational experiences, but were linked too to an emphasis on a continental strategy. These lessons also shaped the mindset of the services and commanders that would be expected to execute future amphibious operations.
The Influence of the Strategic End State
After the First World War, Britain lacked strategic direction. Absence of a primary threat, war weariness, severe financial problems, and pacifism led to severe disarmament. For most of its history, the British have relied upon a dominant maritime strategy. However, a French dominated continental doctrine was becoming more influential in Britain just prior to the First World War. A war affecting Britain's survival would be fought in Europe; there one concentrated its forces at the decisive point to obtain victory, rather than dilute forces on peripheral operations. As in the last war, it was expected secure ports would be available for landing troops and equipment and little need for a forcible entry from the sea. 7 After World War One, Britain's Navy was only challenged by the United States and Japan, both allies and friends. Therefore the threat did not exist that allowed the Navy to reassert primacy of a maritime strategy. The influence of the continental strategy meant too that experienced troops ready to train for and to conduct amphibious operations were in short supply and in any case, the theory went, they were not really necessary.
Immediately after the last British troops were evacuated from the Gallipoli peninsula, the campaign was studied from the aspect of the future viability of amphibious operations. Each study was fraught with blame and implication. During the inter-war period in Great Britain, this study remained primarily the purview of the various service staff colleges, with almost no troops dedicated to exercises. From these staff colleges, the Manual of Combined Operations was produced in 1925 from the recent war experiences and updated throughout this inter-war period. The manual, however, was principally employed by the staff colleges for use in study and in annual war games and remained an outline sketch of the difficulties of this type of operation. Not until 1938 did the British establish a joint organization, the InterServices Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) for the study of amphibious operations.
Such was the emotional mindset from Gallipoli and the continental strategy that the ISTDC was disbanded in 1939 and not reconstituted until after the fall of France in 1940. Thus, to senior British commanders, there was little strategic requirement for an amphibious campaign, and amphibious operations were relegated to the peripheral, indirect approach. 8 
Operational Experiences
While failure more often invites serious retrospection than victory, it can also intimidate rather than educate. The more they studied the campaign, the more pessimistic many officers became about the utility and likelihood of success of an amphibious landing, especially against firm opposition. These doubts tempered the British thought process as they drew their conclusions about Gallipoli and future amphibious operations. As a result, the British came to the conclusion that in the future such operations were unlikely, but if attempted they should occur at night, avoid opposed landings, and be small rather than large affairs. In coming to this conclusion, the British determined that three principles of war mattered most in amphibious operations: security, surprise, and simplicity. The submarine struck again on 27 May, this time sinking the HMS Majestic. As a result of these two attacks, Admiral de Robeck ordered the fleet to retire to the relative safety of Mudros harbor, which left only small craft offshore were left to provide naval surface fires.
The sight of the Navy's departure left a lasting impression on the Army officers on shore. 10 The total failure of operations security, especially the re-embarkation at Alexandria, gave the Turks plenty of forewarning of British intentions. Failure to combat load equipment and men for immediate landing in the operations area meant a delay that enabled the Turks to prepare for the arrival of the British force. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was convinced too that an invasion fleet was extremely vulnerable to enemy detection and air attack. Thus, secrecy and operational protection became paramount to the likelihood for success.
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Surprise. Of the many lessons the British derived, the worst failures resulted from a lack of surprise. Its effects were noted in their Manual of Combined Operations revisions of 1931 and 1938, which devoted significant attention for the need of secrecy and surprise. There were some good reasons for this emphasis. Night landings at Anzac and later at Suvla beaches attained surprise and relatively few casualties were suffered in the initial landings.
The daylight landing at V Beach, against prepared Turkish defenses, met withering fire that halted movement ashore until after darkness when troops then resumed landing without serious casualties. The British drew heavily from these two different experiences. They noted too, the use of an amphibious demonstration off of Bulair in April enabled surprise at the main and secondary attacks, giving numerical superiority at a key moment. 12 The advent of modern land transportation, and with it the ability to rapidly move counterattack forces to repulse a beach landing, made operational surprise critical.
Therefore the assaulting force convoy would arrive shortly before dawn at a position three to six miles off the place of landing. By timing a landing for shortly before dawn, it was believed that the fleet would remain outside enemy observation and the radius of enemy aircraft. When surprise was lost too early, the British found their inland progress stifled by the Turk's ability to rapidly move reserves, especially on 26 April and again in August after the Suvla landing, which halted expansion and breakout from the lodgment areas.
13
Operational fires, primarily naval gunfire, were discounted in favor of surprise; tactical fires were to be employed after surprise was lost following the initial landing. The British, and especially General Hamilton, were not impressed with the effects of naval gunfire upon land targets and instead focused on the fires limitations: ammunition type and a flat trajectory. Since the approach to the amphibious operations area and the landing itself were timed for the hours of darkness, the effectiveness of naval gunfire was limited.
14 Simplicity. The British recognized that the amphibious assault was one of the most complicated of military operations. An assault, fraught with the need for inter-service cooperation, detailed planning, and operational secrecy, translated into the need for simplicity. These meant operations would be smaller and more than likely be raids, such as the landings that destroyed the Turkish guns a Point Helles in February 1915, and the night raid at Zeebrugge, Belgium, in April1918 against German submarine pens. Opposed landings would greatly complicate matters. The British also felt that a most grievous error at Gallipoli was poor staff work; if a plan were to succeed, it must be simple and rapidly understandable to Army, Navy, and Air Force participants and then rigidly adhered to. 15 Means Available to the Operational Commander During the years between the two world wars, pacifism and a desire for disarmament were prevalent forces. While staff colleges might study the lesson of Gallipoli, the operating forces faced fiscal constraints and remained focused on a continental strategy and capital ships to defend the empire. There were not enough funds, equipment, and manpower to devote to the development of the theory of amphibious operations. Fiscal and equipment shortages aside, because of the general belief that air, mobile reserves, and submarines had limited the probability of success, there was little interest in fighting for amphibious forces and equipment. This, in turn, tended to stifle development outside of theory in the staff colleges, while operational commanders rarely sought it as an option.
The Royal Navy during these years did not envision the need to seize well defended islands since there were no obvious threats. One British naval officer noted as late as 1938 that "the Admiralty cannot visualize any particular combined operation [i.e., amphibious operation] taking place and are not therefore prepared to devote any considerable sum of money to such study." 16 The Royal Marines, who with an amphibious tradition, might have been expected to push for doctrine and equipment development, played less of a role.
Following World War One, its manning level was cut by nearly seventy-five percent and they resumed most of their pre-war activities as members of ships company.
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The Army, with bitter memories of Gallipoli, might in the Staff Colleges discuss the lessons from that operation, but invested little effort in its operating forces. Its officers fully expected that just as like in the First World War, the Navy would ferry them across the Channel to prepared ports in the next war in Europe. Diversions like amphibious operations would only strip needed forces from the likely main effort on the continent. Except for study and war gaming, the Army, with its focus on a continental strategy, had neither the interest, manpower, nor the funding to further explore amphibious operations. 18 The RAF was focused on strategic air attack, itself linked to the continental strategy.
Aircraft were employed at Gallipoli, but the verdict on their effectiveness was undecided and never pursued. Yet, as the British developed its air force, their aviators were convinced more than ever that the landing ships and craft would not survive an approach to the beaches that were defended by enemy aircraft.
19
Friction between the services added to the dearth of study and practice of what was learned from the Gallipoli campaign. Reduced manpower, combined with a focus on the continent, further complicated the issue by limiting joint amphibious exercises. Limited funds hampered too the development of suitable craft for ship to shore movement, since each service wondered who was going to pay for what. 20 Since none of the services had more than a theoretical role, there was no single proponent for amphibious operations who could assemble all the lessons from Gallipoli and unify the effort for doctrine and equipment development. Yet, from their experiences and knowledge of new technologies, the British came to the conclusions that future amphibious operations were unlikely, but if attempted, should occur at night, should avoid opposed landings, and would be smaller rather than large affairs. Without the detailed doctrine, troops, and equipment to validate these conclusions, the memory of Gallipoli continued to weigh opinion heavily against future amphibious operations.
The American Approach
For the Americans, with their eye on a maritime strategy that required advance naval bases, the Gallipoli campaign provided a wealth of lessons worthy of study. Unlike their British counterparts, the campaign was not an emotional experience that cast doubt over the operational commanders. Still many American military thinkers tended to agree with the British supposition that modern submarines, mines, and aircraft, as well as overland transportation, which allowed the rapid deployment of forces, had all combined to relegate amphibious operations to a position of being a least likely option.
The Influence of the Strategic End State
In the interwar years Japan was seen as the primary threat to the United States security interests in the Pacific. In the joint Army/Navy lexicon of colored war plans, Orange was the plan for use in a war with Japan and was the plan of most interest to both services. In order to bring the war to Japan, the Americans would require a series of campaigns that would The operational area the Americans expected to fight in, the Pacific, brought with it challenges quite different from those that Britain faced on the European continent. The small islands, possibly reinforced for defense, provided only limited beaches capable of supporting an amphibious operation or maneuver. As a result, the Americans understood the extreme likelihood that landings would be opposed. The requirement to move over great distances with the entire force meant the operations would be large-scale affairs. Overwhelming superiority on the sea and in the air were required to isolate the objective, while a significant force would be necessary to both seize a lodgment area and secure the entire island. The importance of proper combat loading of men and equipment was reinforced by the British experience at Gallipoli and became an essential ingredient to success.
23
Offensive. The Americans noted the British success in gaining a foothold on the beaches, in both the April and August landings on the Gallipoli peninsula. However, they thought the British tended to focus too much on the ship to shore phase at the expense of expanding the lodgment area. The Americans trained to quickly organize on the beach and move rapidly inland to secure the island. The lack of offensive spirit at Sulva in August 1915, when the British landed with overwhelming superiority and then halted after securing a lodgment, was a clear demonstration. Offensive action there might have proven decisive. The quicker the objective was secured the sooner the vulnerable fleet offshore could disperse; German submarine attacks off Gallipoli a month after the initial landings highlighted this point.
24
Mass. Mass of forces and effects were essential in seizing a lodgment and securing an island. Sea and air control were necessary too, as Ellis had seen the need to isolate the objective area and prevent the enemy from interfering in the landing or introducing strategic reserves. At Gallipoli, the British landed a smaller covering force to secure a toehold before landing the main force after the element of surprise was lost. The Americans instead saw the need for a powerful force in the first echelon since they fully expected an opposed landing. 25 The Marines too stressed the requirement for the massed effects of fires, primarily naval gunfire. They preferred to listen to German General Liman von Sanders who, while at Gallipoli with the Turks, credited the effectiveness of British fires with keeping the defenders from approaching the beach and denying them respite too. The island fortresses the Americans expected to attack would require substantial bombardment, days prior, to prepare them for amphibious assault, while pre-assault fires would further isolate the objective.
Since tactical naval fires were most effectively adjusted on target in daylight, that fact further supported the selection of daylight vice night time landings.
26
Unity of command. The importance of unity of command was recognized by both the British and Americans, but it became a driving point to the Americans. The failure to obtain unity of command, and with it unity of effort, hampered British operations at Gallipoli.
There they relied upon cooperation between General Hamilton and Admiral de Robeck, rather than a joint force commander. The failures in staff planning also begged for a single commander who could assign responsibilities to keep the planning of the entire operation unified. Relations between the naval and land component commanders were critical in identifying the mission and objectives, both strategic and operational, while overseeing tactical guidance.
27
These principles contrasted with the British emphasis on surprise and security. Surprise, while important, was not as essential to success to the Americans as it was to the British.
What was important was to establish sea control and air superiority around the isolated island so that the enemy would not be able to shift reserves to affect the landing or expansion of the lodgment. This was a critical difference. At Gallipoli the Turks were able to shift reserves to threatened areas faster than the British could land their own and to break out of the lodgment areas, this would hardly be possible on an island isolated by sea and air control. 28 Night landings were not the preferred option either. Ellis noted that "Night landings in force are dangerous unless the coast conditions and enemy defenses are well known." 29 As
we've seen, the night landings at ANZAC on 25 April were fraught with confusion, as units landed at the wrong beaches and had trouble deciphering proper objectives once ashore in the dark. Instead, it was determined to approach the amphibious objective are under the cover of darkness and land at dawn. Finally, security would best be ensured by proper sea and air control combined with a rapid seizure of the objective to allow dispersal of the fleet.
Thus, the Americans came to different operational conclusions than the British. The
Americans expected and trained for opposed landings. Daylight landings were necessary to enable accurate naval gunfire support and reduce confusion upon landing. The vast expanses of the Pacific and the need to bring all forces and logistics, as well as secure the sea and air around the objective area, meant the landings would be large scale operations.
The Means Available to the Operational Commander
In developing amphibious doctrine, a major difference for the Americans was the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps to experiment with amphibious doctrine development. Inter-service rivalry, like that which plagued Britain, was not as detrimental to the Americans, since the Navy and the Marines did not have to coordinate with the other services to develop this doctrine. Another factor was the availability of naval aviation; it was essential for air superiority over the objective area, and contributing to attainment of local sea control, both necessary for successful amphibious assaults.
The U.S. Marines, after all their studies on Gallipoli, were convinced more than ever that amphibious operations were viable, and, unlike their Royal Marine counterparts, they staked their future to the mission of seizing advance naval bases. Frequent amphibious exercises on Culebra on Puerto Rico, in the Panama Canal Zone, and in the Hawaiian Islands provided the opportunity to digest and refine the lessons from Gallipoli and to move beyond theoretical staff talks that hampered their British counterparts. Problems occurred in every exercise, but this was anticipated and considered essential to development. Thus, unlike the British, the Americans had a central repository for studying and translating lessons learned into doctrine.
Conclusions
The intent of this paper was not to demonstrate that, after studying the Gallipoli campaign, that one side correctly interpreted the lessons to be learned while the other did not.
Instead, I hope to have shown how the operational commander is affected by the desired strategic end state, his operational experiences, and the means for execution available to him as he derives and interprets lessons learned from past operations or historical case studies.
This is applicable for both future operations or recommendations for joint force or service competencies. These three reasons explain why the British and Americans came to different conclusions on amphibious doctrine. They also provide considerations essential even today.
Understanding the desired strategic end state of the combatants is critical to an evaluation of why and how they drew the operational lessons learned and applied them. The British strategy in the interwar years focused on campaigns on the continent, where ports would supposedly be available to land troops and equipment. Without a near term maritime threat, little emphasis was placed on the need for amphibious operations. In the United
States, the threat of an empowered Japan required advanced naval bases and the seizure of territory from the sea in order to bring the war to the enemy. The very possibility of a requirement for amphibious operations tempered how one viewed the lessons of history.
One must consider that past operational experiences matter. Perspectives matter very much, and will tend to flavor individual interpretations of history. Gallipoli was a bitter memory for the British. Though they were able to study the campaign with a rational perspective, they tended to focus on how the lessons discounted the applicability of amphibious operations. Lessons learned tended to focus on those that negated the viability of such operations. The Americans on the other hand, not emotionally tied to the Gallipoli campaign, chose to focus on overcoming the obstacles. What was emotional for the Marines was a mission that ensured its relevance: seizure of advance naval bases. The role of the Gallipoli campaign in the development of the operational art of amphibious operations is well recognized. What is significant today is how that role was interpreted and why. As current and future joint force commanders come to grips with near term requirements and long term service competencies, they must avoid an over reliance on a single analogy. How they interpret and what they ask for and practice affects the operational options available to future commanders and staffs. That is why Gallipoli still matters. 30 
The influence of current means available to

